Meltdown

Chris Clearfield and András Tilcsik argue that failures in nuclear plants, hospitals, aircraft, water systems, trading floors and social media campaigns are not unrelated accidents but share a common cause. Their starting point is Charles Perrow's normal accident theory from the 1980s, which the first three chapters extend to newer conditions: the rise of social media, the growing reliance of organisations on computer-based systems, and the increasing complexity of modern financial, transport and communication networks. Companies, governments and individuals, they warn, have become dangerously dependent on complex and tightly coupled systems while ignoring simple fixes that could head off both accidents and deliberate wrongdoing. The remaining chapters set out those fixes: designing systems that are more transparent and more loosely coupled, using structured decision tools, learning from near misses and other warning signs, encouraging dissent and scepticism, building diverse teams, learning from outsiders, and preparing for crises. The epilogue calls the present a golden age of meltdowns, yet the authors are optimistic that the remedies are within reach, while cautioning that applying them is hard because it cuts against instinct and against persistent organisational and cultural norms.

Written from the wikipedia article on the book.

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