Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets

Gabaix (2006) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · Read the paper

Gabaix and Laibson explain why hidden fees survive competition. Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices, such as the cost of ink for a printer, are likely to be high, so if all consumers were Bayesian, firms would not shroud information in equilibrium. Shrouding may nonetheless occur in an economy containing some myopic or unaware consumers, and it creates an inefficiency that firms might in principle have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors' customers. The paper's central result is that where add-ons have close substitutes, a curse of debiasing arises and firms cannot profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add-ons. In equilibrium, two kinds of exploitation coexist. This is the paper this publication cites whenever a reader asks why some firm does not simply compete by showing the full price.

Gabaix and Laibson explain why hidden fees survive competition. Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices, such as the cost of ink for a printer, are likely to be high, so if all consumers were Bayesian, firms would not shroud information in equilibrium. Shrouding may nonetheless occur in an economy containing some myopic or unaware consumers, and it creates an inefficiency that firms might in principle have an incentive to eliminate by educating their competitors' customers. The paper's central result is that where add-ons have close substitutes, a curse of debiasing arises and firms cannot profitably debias consumers by unshrouding add-ons. In equilibrium, two kinds of exploitation coexist. This is the paper this publication cites whenever a reader asks why some firm does not simply compete by showing the full price.

Written from the abstract, OpenAlex.

What our sources record

Reproduced as it was written when this source was checked, figures and all.

Gabaix, X., & Laibson, D. (2006). 'Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets.' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), 505-540. Shrouding may occur in an economy with some myopic or unaware consumers; where add-ons have close substitutes a curse of debiasing arises and firms cannot profitably debias consumers by unshrouding. doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.505

Where we use it

  • Count the Steps In, Then the Steps Out, Why We Come Back

Reliability of this reference

The link below was matched against the publisher's record on title, first author and year, and all three agree.

The source

https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.505

DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2006.121.2.505