Towards a competitive arousal model of decision-making: a study of auction fever in live and Internet auctions

Ku (2005) · Kellogg Journal of Organization Behavior, full text read · Read the paper

No abstract could be found for this paper, so this page does not summarise it.

No abstract could be found for this paper, so this page does not summarise it.

What our sources record

Reproduced as it was written when this source was checked, figures and all.

doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.10.001. Abstract not reachable (publisher blocked). Model as described in Adam, M. T. P., Ku, G., & Lux, E. (2019), 'Auction fever: the unrecognized effects of incidental arousal', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 80, 52-58, doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2018.07.009, full text read; Cows on Parade prices roughly seven times estimates, live bidding larger overbids than internet, frequent bidders no more prone than novices, as reported in Malhotra and Ku's summary 'How to harness auction fever', Harvard Business School Working Knowledge, full text read; Chicago, 1999, and live and internet sales confirmed in Ku, G. (2000), Kellogg Journal of Organization Behavior, full text read.