The Handicap Principle

The Handicap Principle

Reviewed by Faisal Zaidi

The handicap principle is the proposal that a signal is honest because it is costly to produce. Amotz Zahavi put it forward in 1975, Alan Grafen modelled it in 1990, and a 2020 review by Dustin Penn and Szabolcs Számadó argues that it lacks theoretical and empirical support.

What it is

Zahavi's 1975 paper on mate selection proposed that a costly display can be an honest signal in part because of its cost. Over the following years he clarified the idea with the notions of waste and signal selection, and in 1977 he proposed a separate account in which males adjust how much they invest in a signal according to their condition.

Grafen's 1990 paper, Biological signals as handicaps, built an evolutionarily stable strategy model. It reported that a stable honest signalling equilibrium exists when the conditions of the principle are met. Those conditions are that receivers infer quality correctly from the level of advertising, that advertising lowers the signaller's fitness, and that the marginal cost of advertising is lower for the better signaller.

In effect

The principle gave behavioural ecology an account of why displays that look wasteful can be believable. It also fed the wider body of costly signalling theory, which Michael Spence's 1973 job market model reached from economics with the same central condition: the signal must cost less for the type that really has the quality.

Kevin Simler and Robin Hanson's The Elephant in the Brain applies the framework to ordinary life, and Rob Nelissen and Marijn Meijers (2011) tested it on luxury brand labels in seven experiments. These human applications extend the biology and are not results of it.

What it does not say

The principle is contested. Penn and Számadó (2020) argue that the ideas of waste and signal selection are logically flawed, that Grafen's models support the 1977 trade-off account and not the handicap principle, and that the principle became dominant through misinterpretation. Grafen's abstract takes the opposite reading and presents the model as a vindication of Zahavi's main claims.

The two sides agree on one thing: in the models each describes, the cost of a signal depends on the quality of the signaller. They disagree about whether extravagance is what keeps a signal honest. A claim that waste alone guarantees honesty goes further than either account needs.


Sources

  1. Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selection: A selection for a handicap. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 53(1), 205-214. doi:10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3 https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3
  2. Grafen, A. (1990). Biological signals as handicaps. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 144(4), 517-546. doi:10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80088-8 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80088-8
  3. Penn, D. J., & Számadó, S. (2020). The Handicap Principle: how an erroneous hypothesis became a scientific principle. Biological Reviews, 95(1), 267-290. doi:10.1111/brv.12563 https://doi.org/10.1111/brv.12563
  4. Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355-374. doi:10.2307/1882010 https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010