Commitment devices
This review sets recent evidence on commitment devices beside theory on why people demand them and whether they work. The authors distinguish hard from soft commitments and argue that soft commitments help explain observed behaviour and guide the design of effective devices, and that particular modelling assumptions matter for predicting when commitment devices will be demanded. They cover laboratory and field evidence on demand, informal and formal devices, and policy implications including sin taxes, consumer protection and device design.
This review sets recent evidence on commitment devices beside theory on why people demand them and whether they work. The authors distinguish hard from soft commitments and argue that soft commitments help explain observed behaviour and guide the design of effective devices, and that particular modelling assumptions matter for predicting when commitment devices will be demanded. They cover laboratory and field evidence on demand, informal and formal devices, and policy implications including sin taxes, consumer protection and device design.
Written from the abstract read 2026-10-27 via OpenAlex.
What our sources record
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Bryan, G., Karlan, D., & Nelson, S. (2010). 'Commitment devices.' Annual Review of Economics, 2, 671-698. doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.102308.124324