The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis
Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber challenge the assumption in models of asymmetric information that better-informed agents can reproduce the judgements of less-informed ones. In individual and market experiments they report that better-informed agents could not ignore their private information even when ignoring it would have benefited them, which they name the curse of knowledge. Their abstract says market forces reduced the bias but did not eliminate it.
Camerer, Loewenstein and Weber challenge the assumption in models of asymmetric information that better-informed agents can reproduce the judgements of less-informed ones. In individual and market experiments they report that better-informed agents could not ignore their private information even when ignoring it would have benefited them, which they name the curse of knowledge. Their abstract says market forces reduced the bias but did not eliminate it.
Written from the abstract, journal record, 2026-10-31.
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Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, M. (1989). The curse of knowledge in economic settings: An experimental analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 97(5), 1232-1254. doi:10.1086/261651