Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree
Kahneman and Klein report an effort to compare two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often seen as conflicting, heuristics and biases and naturalistic decision making. Starting from the fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvellous and sometimes flawed, they try to map the boundary conditions separating true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that judging the likely quality of an intuitive judgement requires an assessment of how predictable the environment is and of the person's opportunity to learn its regularities, and that subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgement accuracy.
Kahneman and Klein report an effort to compare two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often seen as conflicting, heuristics and biases and naturalistic decision making. Starting from the fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvellous and sometimes flawed, they try to map the boundary conditions separating true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that judging the likely quality of an intuitive judgement requires an assessment of how predictable the environment is and of the person's opportunity to learn its regularities, and that subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgement accuracy.
Written from the abstract via OpenAlex record, 2026-11-03; full text not read.
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Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. American Psychologist, 64(6). doi:10.1037/a0016755 https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016755