Intuitive prediction: Biases and corrective procedures
This chapter by Kahneman and Tversky opens by noting that forecasting rests heavily on judgment and intuition, including in the choice of variables and values in mathematical models, so the factors that limit the accuracy of expert judgment need analysis. It distinguishes singular information, which is evidence about the particular case, from distributional information, which is base-rate knowledge of outcomes in similar situations. This summary rests on the opening of the chapter as indexed at OpenAlex.
This chapter by Kahneman and Tversky opens by noting that forecasting rests heavily on judgment and intuition, including in the choice of variables and values in mathematical models, so the factors that limit the accuracy of expert judgment need analysis. It distinguishes singular information, which is evidence about the particular case, from distributional information, which is base-rate knowledge of outcomes in similar situations. This summary rests on the opening of the chapter as indexed at OpenAlex.
Written from the abstract read 2026-10-25 via OpenAlex.
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12, 313-327. The link is to the 1982 reprint, Judgment under Uncertainty, Cambridge University Press, 414-421.