Judged frequency of lethal events
Lichtenstein and colleagues ran a series of experiments on how people estimate the frequency of causes of death. The estimates were highly consistent but systematically distorted. Small frequencies were overestimated and large ones underestimated, and at any given true frequency some causes were exaggerated and others understated. The authors traced the biases to disproportionate exposure, memorability and imaginability, and found that participants could not correct for them even when told to avoid them. The paper compares the results with earlier laboratory studies, suggests ways to improve frequency judgements and discusses the implications for managing societal hazards.
Lichtenstein and colleagues ran a series of experiments on how people estimate the frequency of causes of death. The estimates were highly consistent but systematically distorted. Small frequencies were overestimated and large ones underestimated, and at any given true frequency some causes were exaggerated and others understated. The authors traced the biases to disproportionate exposure, memorability and imaginability, and found that participants could not correct for them even when told to avoid them. The paper compares the results with earlier laboratory studies, suggests ways to improve frequency judgements and discusses the implications for managing societal hazards.
Written from the abstract, University of Oregon Scholars' Bank record.
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Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., Layman, M., & Combs, B. (1978). Judged frequency of lethal events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4(6), 551-578. doi:10.1037//0278-7393.4.6.551