Protesting too much: Self-deception and self-signaling

McKay (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · Read the paper

Ryan McKay, Danica Mijović-Prelec and Drazen Prelec respond to von Hippel and Trivers. They argue that the evolutionary account overlooks the subjective moral costs of self-deception and the question of how credible self-deceptive statements are. They propose a self-signalling interpretation, which they say can explain the ritualistic quality of some self-deceptive affirmations and the gap between what self-deceivers say and what they actually believe.

Ryan McKay, Danica Mijović-Prelec and Drazen Prelec respond to von Hippel and Trivers. They argue that the evolutionary account overlooks the subjective moral costs of self-deception and the question of how credible self-deceptive statements are. They propose a self-signalling interpretation, which they say can explain the ritualistic quality of some self-deceptive affirmations and the gap between what self-deceivers say and what they actually believe.

Written from the abstract read 2026-10-26 via the publisher or RePEc record.

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McKay, R., Mijović-Prelec, D., & Prelec, D. (2011). Protesting too much: Self-deception and self-signaling. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(1), 34-35. doi:10.1017/S0140525X10002608