Limits on perception of cognitive processes: A reply to Nisbett and Wilson
Smith and Miller reply to Nisbett and Wilson's argument that people lack access to the cognitive processes that cause their behaviour. They criticise it on theoretical and methodological grounds: that the position is stated in a way that cannot be falsified, that it defines causality so as to deny subjects access to such information, that it gives no definition of the processes subjects cannot report, and that some supporting studies used inappropriate statistical tests. A reanalysis of one such study is offered as evidence of access.
Smith and Miller reply to Nisbett and Wilson's argument that people lack access to the cognitive processes that cause their behaviour. They criticise it on theoretical and methodological grounds: that the position is stated in a way that cannot be falsified, that it defines causality so as to deny subjects access to such information, that it gives no definition of the processes subjects cannot report, and that some supporting studies used inappropriate statistical tests. A reanalysis of one such study is offered as evidence of access.
Written from the abstract as shown on the OpenAlex record, read 2026-11-04.
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Smith, E. R., & Miller, F. D. (1978). Limits on perception of cognitive processes: A reply to Nisbett and Wilson. Psychological Review, 85(4), 355-362. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.85.4.355.