The psychology of coordination and common knowledge
Thomas and colleagues note that research on human cooperation has concentrated on the puzzle of altruism, in which one actor incurs a cost to benefit another, and on the psychology of reciprocity that evolved to solve it. They examine the complementary puzzle of mutualism, in which actors can benefit each other simultaneously, and the psychology of coordination that secures those benefits. Coordination, they argue, is facilitated by common knowledge, the recursive belief state in which A knows X, B knows that A knows X, A knows that B knows that A knows X, and so on without end. The experiments test whether people are sensitive to common knowledge when deciding whether to engage in risky coordination. Participants chose between working alone for a certain profit and working with a partner for a potentially higher profit they would receive only if the partner made the same choice. More participants attempted the risky coordination when the payoffs had been broadcast over a loudspeaker than when the same information was merely shared or was private. The authors read this as evidence that people represent common knowledge as a distinct cognitive category that licenses them to coordinate for mutual gain.
Thomas and colleagues note that research on human cooperation has concentrated on the puzzle of altruism, in which one actor incurs a cost to benefit another, and on the psychology of reciprocity that evolved to solve it. They examine the complementary puzzle of mutualism, in which actors can benefit each other simultaneously, and the psychology of coordination that secures those benefits. Coordination, they argue, is facilitated by common knowledge, the recursive belief state in which A knows X, B knows that A knows X, A knows that B knows that A knows X, and so on without end. The experiments test whether people are sensitive to common knowledge when deciding whether to engage in risky coordination. Participants chose between working alone for a certain profit and working with a partner for a potentially higher profit they would receive only if the partner made the same choice. More participants attempted the risky coordination when the payoffs had been broadcast over a loudspeaker than when the same information was merely shared or was private. The authors read this as evidence that people represent common knowledge as a distinct cognitive category that licenses them to coordinate for mutual gain.
Written from the abstract, OpenAlex.
What our sources record
Reproduced as it was written when this source was checked, figures and all.
Participants chose between working alone for a certain profit and working together for a potentially higher profit received only if the partner made the same choice; more participants attempted risky coordination under common knowledge, broadcast over a loudspeaker, than under shared knowledge conveyed by a messenger or private knowledge revealed separately. The authors extend the account to public protest among other phenomena. Verified at the published record 2026-10-01. doi:10.1037/a0037037
Where we use it
- The Price Rise Everyone Saw, Why We Act
Reliability of this reference
No persistent link has been resolved for this source yet.
The source
No link available. The citation as the article records it:
Thomas, K. A., DeScioli, P., Haque, O. S., & Pinker, S. (2014). 'The psychology of coordination and common knowledge.' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 107(4), 657-676. Participants chose between working alone for a certain profit and working together for a potentially higher profit received only if the partner made the same choice; more participants attempted risky coordination under common knowledge, broadcast over a loudspeaker, than under shared knowledge conveyed by a messenger or private knowledge revealed separately. The authors extend the account to public protest among other phenomena. Verified at the published record 2026-10-01. doi:10.1037/a0037037