The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman argue that the psychological principles governing how decision problems are perceived, and how probabilities and outcomes are evaluated, produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. They show reversals of preference in choices about monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions about the loss of human lives. They compare the effect of frames on preferences with the effect of perspective on how an object looks, and they conclude that the dependence of preferences on how a problem is formulated is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman argue that the psychological principles governing how decision problems are perceived, and how probabilities and outcomes are evaluated, produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. They show reversals of preference in choices about monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions about the loss of human lives. They compare the effect of frames on preferences with the effect of perspective on how an object looks, and they conclude that the dependence of preferences on how a problem is formulated is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.
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Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453-458. doi:10.1126/science.7455683 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683